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SORTING OUT FEDERAL AND STATE
JUDICIAL ROLES IN STATE
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM:
ABSTENTION'S
POTENTIAL ROLE
By Charles R. Wise and Robert K. Christensen*

INTRODUCTION

The Kansas City School District will move vigorously to raise
achievement levels of its students after a federal judge dismissed
what had become one of the costliest desegregation cases ever,
Superintendent Benjamin Demps has vowed.
Demps hailed the decision Wednesday by U.S. District Judge
Dean Whipple to free the district from federal court supervision
in a case that had dragged on 22 years and cost the state $2
billion.
In dismissing the case, Whipple said further court involvement
would only get in the way of the district's efforts to improve
student achievement. He said court involvement over the years
had probably contributed to turmoil in the district-citing infighting on the school board and the revolving door that led to
18 superintendents in 30 years.
Whipple praised the district for its attempts to meet federal
court orders since a lawsuit was filed in 1977 seeking to desegregate the district through an exchange of students on both sides
of the state line.
* Charles Wise is currently a professor of Public Affairs at Indiana University.
Professor Wise is the former director of Intergovernmental Affairs at the U.S. De-

partment of Justice. In addition, he has been awarded the Mosher Award for Best
Academic Article in Public Administration Review three times. He is also the former
president of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. Professor Wise received his Ph.D. in Political Science at Indiana University in
1972.
Robert Christensen is a Research Associate for the Institute for the Study of Government and the Nonprofit Sector. Mr. Christensen is a Ph.D. Candidate (2005) in
the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. He received
his J.D. in 2000 from the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University,
and his M.P.A. in 2000 from the George W. Romney Institute of Public Management,
Bringham Young University.
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Despite those positive steps, Whipple refused to overturn the
state Board of Education's decision Oct. 21 to strip the district
of accreditation beginning in May. The board found that the district failed to meet 11 performance standards used by the state
to measure student achievement.
Whipple said the district's appeal of that decision was the latest
example of how the district had used the court to shield itself
from accountability for the continued performance of its
students.'

If a plaintiff sues a state or local institution for violating constitutional or federal statutory rights, when should federal courts intervene, and when should they defer to state courts? Federal courts
must consider many factors when framing a remedy designed to
reform a state or local institution. The consistent application of
these factors has proven particularly troublesome for federal courts
in situations where institutional reform is sought.
Institutional reform remedies involve not only social, economic,
and political factors, but also complex organization and management issues intertwined with considerations of policy and scienceissues federal courts often have little familiarity with. Courts have,
for example, been attempting to sort out the findings of social studies and discern their meaning for remedial policies in desegregation
cases. 2 Judicial decrees that involve budget allocations and taxations have forced courts to repeatedly revisit their decisions in the
face of changing economic, macro-budgetary, and cost conditions.
Remedial options are further complicated by the existence of state
common law and statutes already governing state or local institutions. Superimposed on these complexities are the actions of state
officials and state courts, who may already be addressing the very
problems the plaintiff has brought to federal court. The result is a
vexing dichotomy of competing imperatives. On one hand, state
courts are responsible for overseeing state and local agencies and
applying federal and state laws to their operations. On the other
hand, federal courts are fundamentally responsible for ensuring the
vindication of federal rights.
1. Craig Horst, Federal Judge Ends Decades Old KC School DesegregationSuit,

Nov. 18, 1999, available at WESTLAW, Associated Press Newswires Plus.
2. In reviewing literature on the use of sociological research in judicial lawmaking, one author concluded, "What is striking is that the considered views of thoughtful
commentators on the indispensability of social science, and the impossibility of developing a methodology for dealing with it have remained relatively constant." William
A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 648 n.45 (1982).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to sort out these competing imperatives by according federal courts the authority to abstain from hearing certain cases. This doctrine has never been fully
articulated and, as a result, has led to confusion among federal
courts. Further, state courts and institutions lack sufficient clarity
to foresee when, and under what conditions, a federal court will
defer to their judgment.
The ambiguity surrounding the abstention doctrine in institutional reform cases hinders the effective reform of state and local
institutions. 3 Such ambiguity also threatens the legitimacy and effectiveness of federal courts and their role in safeguarding individual rights.4 Abstention has the potential to play an increasingly
useful function in sorting out the roles of state and federal courts in
institutional reform litigation. That potential will only be realized,
however, if the requirements for abstention are better articulated
and if a clear rationale, grounded in sound law and administration,
is supplied. This piece attempts to do exactly that: to clarify the
abstention requirements and provide a clear rationale for the
doctrine.
Part I of this piece discusses the origin and development of the
abstention doctrine, focusing specifically on Burford abstention, a
kind of abstention particularly salient to institutional reform cases.
Part I also illustrates the inconsistencies inherent in the application
of the abstention doctrine in its current form. Parts II and III propose that federal courts, in considering whether to grant Burford
abstention, should analyze three requirements: judicial capacity,
federalism, and administrative responsibility. This piece concludes
that all three requirements play a significant role in achieving a
reasonable division of labor between federal and state courts and
can assist policymakers in initiating institutional reforms in agencies implicated in rights violations.
I.

A.

ABSTENTION

Roots of Abstention

The abstention doctrine permits federal judges, at their discretion, to decline to decide cases otherwise properly before the federal courts. Abstention is grounded in principles of comity and
3. See infra notes167-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
5. ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE:

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 74 (1999).
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federalism.6 It is based on the notion that federal courts should not
intrude in sensitive state political and judicial controversies unless
absolutely necessary. 7 Proponents of abstention feel such controversies should instead be settled by state courts. 8
The debate surrounding the abstention doctrine, in existence for
seventy years, is by no means settled. Some would greatly limit
abstention's potency by emphasizing the word "virtually" in the
Supreme Court's depiction of a "virtually unflagging obligation of
the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them."9 Abstention's supporters emphasize Justice Frankfurter's statement of
federalism in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. that
"[f]ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a
federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state
policies.""°
Abstention, as a doctrine, owes its heritage to the seminal cases
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. 1 and Burford v. Sun
Oil Co.12
B. Pullman
On March 3, 1941, the Supreme Court gave its
first articulation
13
of the abstention doctrine: Pullman abstention.
The plaintiffs in Pullman, the Pullman Railroad Company and its
porters, attacked a Texas Railroad Commission order forbidding
sleeping cars from being operated on Texas railroads unless controlled by Pullman conductors (not porters).1 4 The Pullman Company argued the order violated Texas law and the U.S.
Constitution's Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce
Clauses.15 The Company's protest centered on the fact that, in6
many cases, a train would carry only one Pullman passenger car.'
6. Id. at 74.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1970).
10. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
11. Id.

12. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
13. See Julie A Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Roles of
State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 1, 5-6 n.26

(1986).
14. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497-98 (quoting the Texas Railroad Commission's applicable order).
15. Id. at 498.
16. Id.
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The Company felt, in such cases, a Pullman porter was sufficient to
attend the car. 7 The Pullman porters, who were black, echoed the
Company's objections but mainly objected to the 1order
as racially
8
discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court recognized the presence of significant constitutional questions,1 9 the Court abstained from judgment
for several reasons. The Pullman Court's decision was couched in
terms of a duty of judicial economy.20 The Court noted the tradition of federal courts avoiding constitutional adjudication if the
controversy could be resolved by ruling on a state issue. 21 The
Court also rationalized its decision to abstain out of a respect for
the independence of state governments.22 Pullman abstention,
then, allows federal courts to abstain so that state courts can settle
an underlying issue of state law and, in so doing, avert the need for
a federal court to solve the federal constitutional question.
C. Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
Burford abstention arose in the Supreme Court in 1943, approximately two years after Pullman. Burford involved the validity of
the Texas Railroad Commission order granting the defendant Burford a permit to drill four wells in an East Texas oil field. 23 Federal
jurisdiction was sought on the basis of the diversity of citizenship,
and because of Sun Oil's contention that the Commission's order
granting Burford the drilling permit denied Sun Oil its right to due
process concerning its interest in the oil.24 Pertinent to Burford's
background is that Texas,
[w]ith full knowledge of the importance of the decisions of the
Railroad Commission both to the State and to the oil operators
ha[d] established a system of thorough judicial review by its
own state courts. The Commission orders may be appealed to a
state district court in Travis County, and are reviewed by a
...

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id. (stating that "[sluch constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a
definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy. It is therefore
our duty to turn to a consideration of questions under Texas law.").
21. Davies, supra note 13, at 6 (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498).
22. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (quoting Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 457 (1919)).
23. Burford, 319 U.S. at 316-17.
24. Id. at 317.
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branch 5of the Court of Civil Appeals and by the State Supreme
2
Court.

Despite having proper federal jurisdiction, the Burford Court
abstained from decision. Unlike Pullman, where the federal dis-

trict court was given jurisdiction while the issue of state law was
being decided by a state court, the Burford Court entirely dismissed the case.26 The reason for dismissal defines the core of Burford abstention:
[Q]uestions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency ... so clearly involves [sic] basic problems of Texas
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the
Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them. 'Few public
interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies .... 27

In essence, the Burford Court abstained to prevent federal

judges from interfering with complicated state administrative
schemes.2 8
D.

Ensuing Abstention Doctrines

In the years following Pullman and Burford, additional decisions
added texture to general abstention doctrine.
Younger v. Harris29 involved a constitutional challenge to the

California Criminal Act. Harris, indicted under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, filed in federal district court to enjoin

Younger, the county District Attorney, from prosecuting him.

°

Harris contended the Act violated his constitutional freedom of

speech and press. 3 The Supreme Court held that federal courts
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions absent ex25. Id. at 325. The court went on to add that "[t]o prevent the confusion of multiple review of the same general issues, the legislature provided for concentration of all
direct review of the Commission's orders in the state district courts of Travis County."
Id. at 326.
26. See id. at 334. See also Davies, supra note 13, at 12.
27. Burford, 319 U.S. at 332 (quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501); see also Lewis
Yelin, Note, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871,
1875-76 (1999) (citations omitted).
28. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 75-76 (1984).
29. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
30. See id. at 38-39.
31. See id.
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traordinary circumstances.32 In essence, the Younger decision
urged federal courts to refrain from interfering with pending state
criminal proceedings.33 In its modern form, Younger abstention is
thought appropriate (1) if the state action is an ongoing judicial
proceeding (2) implicating important state interests, and (3) the
plaintiff has adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges
in the state proceeding.34
In practice, Younger provides that a federal court may not enjoin
an ongoing state criminal proceeding, even to protect federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has also applied the Younger
doctrine to declaratory relief actions and certain state civil proceedings implicating important state concerns.35
In 1976, the Supreme Court heard Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.3 6 Considering a dispute over water

rights, the Colorado River Court held that while a federal court
generally may not decline jurisdiction in the face of a concurrent or
parallel state proceeding, circumstances justifying such a stay,
37
though exceptional, do exist.
In Colorado River, where the United States brought suit in federal district court to clarify water rights in Colorado Water Division
No. 7, several defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that
the federal court "was without jurisdiction to determine federal
water rights" under the McCarran Amendment.38 In particular,
the type of abstention pronounced in Colorado River was energized by the "considerations of '[wise] judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation. "'3 9 Seemingly based more on concerns for
judicial economy than federalism,4 0 the type of abstention pronounced in Colorado River allows a federal court to abstain where
32. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364
(1989).
33. Carl E. Brody, Abstention in the Federal Courts: A Suggested Bifurcated Standard of Review to Create Procedural Reliance Where States and Localities Regulate
Constitutionally Protected Activity, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 539, 556 (2001).
34. Id. at 545 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n.,
457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
35. Redish, supra note 28, at 75.
36. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
37. Redish, supra note 28, at 75 (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818).
38. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 806.
39. Id. at 817 (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
183 (1952)).
40. See James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1092 (1994).
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litigation involving parallel issues of law and fact are simultaneously ongoing in both the state and federal courts.41
E.

Evolution of Abstention

Each named abstention doctrine 42 arose from unique facts and
procedural circumstances, and despite the guidance of case law, abstention remains shrouded in confusion.43 Indeed, fifteen years
ago, Julie Davies highlighted the abstention doctrine's "lack [of]
sufficiently concrete boundaries. ' 44 This led federal courts to make
highly subjective evaluations of the proper allocation of power between federal and state courts.45 The confusion also has resulted in
vast disparities in the availability of federal courts to hear constitutional cases in certain eras. 46 As the following examples illustrate,
inconsistencies and gaps in the abstention doctrine still persist.
1. Gaps and Inconsistencies
One of the most glaring incongruities in the general doctrine of
abstention is the controversy as to which of the named abstention
doctrines constitute abstention at all. For example, a federal district court in Maryland recently declared the Supreme Court had
acknowledged only three general categories of abstention: Pullman, Burford, and Younger.4 7 This holding contradicts the scholar41. Brody, supra note 33, at 556.
42. Named abstentions are, for example, Pullman, Colorado River, Younger, and
Burford abstention, as opposed to the general doctrine of abstention, under which the
named abstentions fall.
43. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 33, at 539-40 (noting that federal courts, while
acknowledging that the various abstention doctrines allow them to refrain from exercising jurisdiction, apply these doctrines inconsistently); David Carter, Sierra Club v.
San Antonio: In Search of the Appropriate Application of the Burford Abstention, 12
BYU J. PUn. L. 375, 375 (1998) (observing that "Burford was to become another of
the difficult to apply abstention doctrines whose appropriate application and scope
remain something of a mystery. . . . [T]he courts remain in conflict regarding the
proper application and scope of the Burford abstention."); Davies, supra note 13, at 3
(stating that "[slome courts appear so baffled by the distinctions between Pullman
and Burford that they apply [both] doctrines in aggregate form").
44. Davies, supra note 13, at 36.
45. Id. at 54.
46. Id.
47. MacFadden v. Balt., No. H-00-3037, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 984, at *7-8 (D.
Md. Jan. 30, 2001) (illustrating Davies' concern that courts confuse the boundaries of
named-abstention doctrines and apply them in aggregate when the court said that
"[t]he two doctrines [Burford and Pullman] overlap and mix together to form the
basis for abstention in particular cases." (internal citations omitted)).
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ship suggesting that Colorado River should be added to the list.48
Others suggest that Rooker-Feldman abstention,4 9 and possibly

even Thibodaux abstention,50 are more than abstention corollaries,
and should be classified as separate abstention doctrines.5 1 That
scholars cannot agree on what constitutes abstention illustrates the
subjectivity and inconsistencies in the outcomes of abstention
cases.5 2 Said another way, the controversy highlights an abiding,
conceptual misunderstanding of the fabric of the abstention
doctrine.
This misunderstanding also makes it difficult to differentiate abstention from non-abstention doctrines, like primary jurisdiction.53
In Arsberry v. Illinois,54 for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals explained that
[clases in which a court refers an issue to an agency because of
the agency's superior expertise ... rather than because of the
48. Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C. L. REV 669, 692-93

(1995) ("The Supreme Court has recognized four [Pullman, Burford, Younger, and
Colorado] primary abstention doctrines each . . .named after the case in which its
principles were first enunciated ....
").But see Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far:
Pruningthe Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 101 (1986) (emphasizing that Colo-

rado River should not be included as a named abstention doctrine because it is really
only "a doctrine of judicial convenience").
49. See Brody, supra note 33, at 556 (explaining that "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine stems from two Supreme Court cases decided sixty years apart, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,[ 263 U.S. 413 (1923)] and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman [460 U.S. 462 (1983)].").
50. See Davies, supra note 13, at 11-12 (suggesting that although Thibodaux, L.A.
Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), has been considered a
corollary of Burford, "the cases present an important distinguishing characteristic").
Although many view Thibodaux as an expansion of Burford, some confusion remains
as to Thibodaux's relation to Pullman. See Rehnquist, supra note 40, at 1079 (noting
that "[b]ecause the only justification for Thibodaux abstention was the presence of an
unsettled question of state law, Thibodaux is arguably not a separate form of abstention from Pullman. Regardless, Thibodaux warrants separate treatment for two reasons: First, it provides a fuller explanation of the "tentative decision" problem
cursorily discussed in Pullman. Second, recent Supreme Court dicta may revive a
brand of Thibodaux that is independent of Pullman abstention").
51. As to Rooker-Feldman:
Rooker-Feldman doctrine ...limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear

certain cases that have their roots in state litigation. The doctrine is applicable where a case has been litigated to some point of finality in the state
system because preclusion rules bar re-litigation of any issues that either
were or could have been raised in the state courts.
Brody, supra note 33, at 55 (internal quotation omitted).
52. Davies, supra note 13, at 54.
53. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two
Chips Off the Same Block?-A ComparativeAnalysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75 (1974).

54. Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001).
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agency's jurisdiction, are not felicitously described as cases of
primary jurisdiction. They are akin to those Burford abstention
cases that . . . concern arcane regulatory issues .... [where]
either court and agency have concurrent jurisdiction to decide
an issue, or only the court has the power to decide it, and seeks
merely the agency's advice. (In the core of the [primary jurisdiction] doctrine, in contrast, the55court has jurisdiction of the case,
but the agency of the issue.).

The distinction is important because primary jurisdiction, unlike
Burford abstention, is exclusive agency jurisdiction.5 6 Primary jurisdiction only applies when an issue arises within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the regulatory agency to resolve, although
usually subject to judicial review.5 7 While the misunderstanding
appears to be merely technical, a clearer view of abstention is necessary to resuscitate its consistent application.
Facing abstention's inconsistencies, one could try to decipher a
pattern of abstention application based on stare decisis. However,
the inconsistent application of the abstention doctrine transcends
such a practical approach. For example, in CapitalBonding Corp.
v. New Jersey Supreme Court,58 a federal district court abstained
from a case exploring the legitimacy of a New Jersey court rule
imposing certain limits on the bail bonding business. 59 The Capital
Bonding court reasoned abstention was appropriate because the
state court offered adequate review to test the legitimacy of the
new bail bonding rule. Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that,
in Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, the case most on point
with CapitalBonding, another district court found abstention inappropriate.6" Regardless of the apparent factual similarities, the
Capital Bonding court found that failure to abstain could significantly disrupt the state's efforts to reform the bail process in New
Jersey's courts, 6 ' whereas the Felmeister Court ruled that regulating
attorney advertising, unlike the regulation of oil and gas conservation as in Burford, does not involve peculiarly local conditions, and
55. Id. at 563-564 (citations omitted). See also Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 206
F.3d 1397 (11th Cir. 2000).
56. See Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563.
57. Id.

58. Capital Bonding Corp. v. N.J. Supreme Court, 127 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.N.J.
2001).
59. Id. at 595 (noting that the reform arguably "penaliz[ed] bail bond insurers

when defendants fail[ed] to appear for court").
60. See id. at 596 (holding that abstention was inappropriate where the New Jersey
Supreme Court had attempted to regulate attorney advertising).

61. Id. at 597.
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therefore does not warrant abstention.6 2 Unfortunately, a thorough reading of both cases does not yield a navigable framework
to interpret how state policy would be disruptive in one case but
not the other.
2.

Organizing and Redefining

Notwithstanding a landscape of inconsistency, recent scholarship
has encouraged a refined understanding of the abstention doctrine,
by suggesting various categorizations illustrating each named abstention component.
A recent law review article by Charles E. Brody suggests one
conceptual model employing a bifurcated standard that contemplates abstention based on (1) judicial economy on the one hand,
and (2) issues of federalism on the other.63 This is a different
model than that of James Rehnquist, who organized the namedabstention doctrines into two categories: cases not requiring a
pending duplicative state suit (Pullman, Burford, and Thibodaux),
and cases predicated upon a pending proceeding in state court
(Younger and Colorado River).64
Organizational constructs aside, the doctrine of abstention is not
static. As the named abstention cases shaped the general notion of
abstention, other cases shaped and refined the seminal abstention
cases. This may, in part, explain why courts have had such difficulty forging a homogenous application of the abstention doctrines.
a. Burford and Quackenbush
In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court limited Burford's scope by
declaring abstention is appropriate only in cases where the plaintiff
seeks equitable or other discretionary relief." The Quackenbush
decision also modified Burford by holding that in damages actions
a federal court cannot dismiss the action, but can enter a stay to
62. Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 1988).
63. Brody, supra note 33, at 556; see also Carter, supra note 43, at 376 (contending
that "Pullman abstention is primarily concerned with avoidance of constitutional
questions if the case can be resolved by resolution of a state law question. It is only
secondarily interested in avoiding friction between federal and state law. The Burford
abstention on the other hand is fundamentally concerned with preventing interference with state law mechanisms, especially in areas of complex state interests.").
64. Rehnquist, supra note 40, at 1053; see also Brody, supra note 33, at 556-57.
65. Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, Va., 135 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 1998)
(citing Quackenbush Ins. Comm'r v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728-731 (1996)).
See also L.A. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux; 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730 (noting that the Supreme Court has "not held that abstention
principles are completely inapplicable in damages actions").
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await the conclusion of state proceedings.66 This modification of
Burford abstention has created some ambiguity as to when a federal court might stay (rather than dismiss or remand) a damages
action under Burford.67
b. Abstention after Colorado River and New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans ("NOPSI") 68
Use of Burford abstention was probably most significantly limited by the Colorado River Court's emphasis on the "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them. ' 69 The Colorado River and NOPSI Courts also highlighted that appropriate Burford analysis requires a two-part test:
First, a federal court sitting in equity should determine whether
timely and adequate review of the challenged regulatory action
is available in state court. Second, having decided that such review is available, the federal court, sitting in equity, must abstain
if one of two circumstances are present: (1) "when there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in
the case at bar'; or (2) where the 'exercise of federal review of
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."70
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's Burford analysis in Colorado River and NOPSI has not resulted in the uniform application
of Burford. Other tests have been articulated by the Circuit Courts
of Appeals on Burford's application. One test promulgated by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that
[a]bstention under Burford is justified if and only if (1) a state
has created a complex regulatory system on a matter of substantial importance to the state, (2) there exist no federal interests in
the matter that override the state interests, and (3) the state legislature has made the state courts integral to the administrative
scheme by delegating to them broad discretion so that they may
participate in the development of regulatory policy.7"
66.
67.
68.
69.

Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 282.
Id. at 1875.
New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976).
70. Capital Bonding Corp. v. N.J. Supreme Court, 127 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (D.N.J.
2001)(quoting New Orleans Public Serv., 491 U.S. at 361) (internal citations omitted).
71. Yelin, supra note 27, at 1881.
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Continuing with this final prong, one of the possible results of
the existence of varied forms of Burford analysis is illustrated by
the disagreement on whether Burford abstention is premised on
the existence of prior state administrative agency action.7 2 Consistency in applying Burford would intuitively necessitate clarification
of the agency's role with respect to abstention actions.
III.

CLARIFYING BURFORD ABSTENTION

Much confusion surrounds the factors federal courts should consider in deciding whether to grant Burford abstention. The Burford doctrine has been a mysterious form of abstention, never
carefully justified by commentator or judicial opinion. 3 Supreme
Court formulations of Burford have been abstract, leading to a variety of views concerning its requirements among the federal
circuits.74
The following discussion focuses on three primary requirements
federal courts should consider in deciding whether to abstain under
Burford. Focusing on these three areas can potentially alleviate
confusion regarding the doctrine's application.
A.

Capacity

A concern about the capacity of federal courts to improve state
administrative schemes permeates the original Burford decision
and should be a factor when considering Burford abstention. Justice Black, the author of Burford's majority opinion, thought abstention would eliminate the confusion that would have resulted if
the federal courts were allowed to review the order of the Texas
There has been considerable debate in
railroad commission.
72. Id. n.53. Courts are divided on this question. Compare Quackenbush Ins.
Comm'r v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 733 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he fact that a state court rather than an agency was chosen to implement
California's scheme provided more reason, not less, for the federal court to stay its
hand") and Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that an
agency's role in the dispute is not essential to Burford abstention), and Friedman v.
Revenue Mgmt., 38 F.3d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding Burford abstention in an
action seeking the involuntary dissolution of a state corporation in the absence of
agency action), with St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding
that "[t]he concerns governing the Burford abstention doctrine are not present in the
instant case. St. Paul's lawsuit does not involve a state administrative proceeding.).
73. Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law
from Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of JudicialFederalismunder Burford v. Sun
Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 979 (1993).
74. Id.

75. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 326-27 (1943).
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scholarly literature over the capacity of federal courts to handle
complex state administrative schemes. While there is no clear consensus, this literature is instructive for Burford's application.
Gerald N. Rosenberg's study identifies three ways the American
political system prevents courts from effecting significant social reform: (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights; (2) the lack of
judicial independence; and (3) the judiciary's lack of powers of implementation.76 Many social reform goals, such as establishing
rights to decent housing or clean air, cannot be plausibly presented
in the name of constitutional rights. In addition, procedural doctrines (i.e., standing) deter participation by knowledgeable reform
groups. Politicians, through judicial appointments and legislative
action, can also constrain the judiciary from pursuing unpopular
social reform on a sustained basis. Further, courts depend on other
bodies to implement their decisions-their decisions cannot alienate the public and the politicians. Rosenberg also identifies four
conditions conducive to helping overcome these constraints which
contribute to court effectiveness: (1) the availability of incentives
for compliance with court mandates; (2) the availability of sanctions for resistance to those mandates; (3) the relevance of markets
to implementing the decisions; and (4) the degree to which institutional actors are ready to proceed with reform and can use courts
to cover their intent.77 Rosenberg's analysis of the effect of these
conditions on the litigation of school desegregation, abortion
rights, and the environment leads him to conclude that courts are
generally in a weak position to effect change. 8 When the three
constraints are overcome, however, and one of the four conditions
is present, courts can produce significant social reform.7 9 Accordingly, court induced change is effected when institutional, structural, and ideological barriers to change are weak.80
Critics of Rosenberg's analysis point to the fact that his analysis
assumes social and economic forces cause changes in society that
institutions cannot affect. In so doing, critics claim, Rosenberg
misses the possible role of courts as regulators of social change. 81
Nonetheless, even Rosenberg's critics acknowledge that his analy76. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE 1- 36 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 33-35.
See id. at 338.
See id.
See id.
81. See Jonathan Simon, "The Long Walk Home" to Politics, 26
REV.

923, 925 (1992) (reviewing

ROSENBURG,

supra note 76).
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sis nicely demonstrates the subtleties of the relationship between
8 2
court effectiveness and contingent political and social conditions.
This relationship strongly suggests judges are unwise to assume
that the remedies they order are certain, or even likely, to change
governmental institutions given the extant political, institutional,
and social conditions. What is needed is a clear-headed analysis of
the constraints and specific conditions in any particular case that
would foster or restrict judicial effectiveness.
Other scholars have pointed to constraints arising from the traditional role of a judge and the difficulties judges face when deciding
upon and implementing remedies in institutional reform cases. For
example, William A. Fletcher observes that, in a suit against an
institution, the judge manages the reconstruction of an ongoing social institution. In doing so, a judge moves far beyond the normal
competence and authority of a judicial officer into an arena where
legal aspirations, bureaucratic possibilities, and political constraints
converge-an arena where ordinary legal rules are frequently inapplicable. 3 Judges often, for example, confront decisions about the
administration of transportation services, the construction and
equipping of buildings, and personnel requirements in school reform cases. As one commentator observed, "Once one comprehends that the court is displacing the [school] board . . . the
occasionally circus-like quality of the hearing becomes more explicable, if not more orderly. It doesn't, as the judge has remarked
upon occasion, look much like a court, and for good reason: it really isn't one.
The task is complicated by the polycentric nature
of the problems involved. Polycentricity is the property of a complex problem with a number of problem 'centers', each related to
the others, such that the solution to each depends on the solution
to all the others.15 In these sorts of cases judges must consider legal and non-legal elements.8 6 Institutional suits often involve nonlegal polycentric problems resolvable only by reference to non-legal criteria. For example, what constitutes "remedial treatment" in
a mental health facility cannot be resolved by reference to legal
doctrines-it implicates multiple issues, including medical, scientific, and psychological theory. These questions require con82. See id. at 933.
83. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 641.
84. Stephen Yeazell, Interventions and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on
the Los Angeles School Case, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 244, 259 (1977).
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id. at 646.
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fronting questions of tactical and political judgment in
implementing the remedies. Further, there are no legal norms to
guide the judge internally, and the traditional means of appellate
control through these legal norms are of little use.8 7 Any decisionmaker seeking to solve polycentric problems confronts a number of
difficulties in that they continually required to perceive which facts
are objective, determine what factors are interrelated, and repeatedly solve the same problems.88 These difficulties are only accentuated in institutional suits:
First, courts are less able than the political branches to apprise
themselves of the "legislative facts" necessary to understand
questions of public policy. Second, since courts normally enforce their judgments by compulsory process without a significant opportunity for reversal or modification by private parties
affected by these judgments, they are less likely than other governmental decisionmakers to solve and re-solve a polycentric
problem until an optimum solution is found. Third, since institutional decrees necessarily entail a great deal of discretion in
their formulation, and since discretionary behavior is largely beyond the power of an appellate body to control, the primary
means of external control over trial court behavior is virtually
useless. Finally, and most important, courts have no institutional authority to assess normatively the ends of possible solutions to non-legal polycentric problems.89
These institutional difficulties or constraints will be confronted
by the judge regardless of the policy area involved. As Fletcher
concludes, "The formulation of the remedial decree thus depends
to an extraordinary extent on the moral and political intuitions of
one person acting not only without effective external control over
his or her actions, but also without even the internal control of legal norms."90
On a related issue, Fuller concludes that when an attempt is
made to deal with a polycentric problem, three things can happen
at once. First, the adjudicative solution may fail. Second, the judge
ignores judicial properties, experimenting with various solutions in
post-hearing conferences, consulting parties not represented at the
hearings, guessing at facts not proved and disregarding a need for
judicial notice. Third, instead of altering judicial procedures to fit
the problem being confronted, a judge may reformulate the prob87. Id. at 660.
88. Id. at 648.
89. Id. at 641.
90. Id.
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lem so as to make it amenable to adjudicative procedures. 91 That
being said, while it may be possible to specify the legal rules being
implicated so as to ensure that the issues of the case fit adjudication, such an approach is not likely to solve the real world
problems the institution is facing.
Federal courts may be tempted to redefine the issues because
courts are structurally worse at developing an intellectually coherent solution to social problems than other arms of government.92
Courts are experienced at determining historical fact and causation. But, in designing structural remedies, they must also predict
how the remedies will affect and be affected by the political, economic, and social context within which the remedy is implemented.
When, for instance, a court puts a magnet school plan into effect, it
is making a prediction about how thousands of budgeting, administrative, and educational processes will interact with the perceptions
of a diverse community, and, ultimately, how enrollment will be
effected. Courts are not well-suited for these tasks because they
have little experience in administering complex institutions and social programs.93 Institutional reform also requires the allocation
and reallocation of resources-a role which courts are often illequipped to undertake.94
Formulating and administering institutional reform remedies
greatly strains the adjudicative model of decision-making because
it defies the usual logic of the judiciary. Institutions are multi-polar
and have shifting relationships requiring the continual adjustment
of interests.95 The judiciary, in contrast, usually confronts a static
and precisely defined conflict in which it looks for an optimal, comprehensive, and final solution. 96 Consequently, to be effective in
91. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
401 (1978).
92. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1137-1138.

93.

H. SCHUCK,
156-61 (1983).
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SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL

94. See Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35
949, 965 (1978), noting that:
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&

LEE

L.
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[a]n institutional remedy inevitably involves allocation of state resources, at
times in major amounts. To such decisions, the more abstract problems, possible countervailing considerations, and possible competing claims are all
highly relevant. There is nothing in the nature of litigation which necessarily
brings these matters out, or indeed, which provides a good vehicle for their

development even if tried.
95. Colin S. Diver, The Judge As Political Powerbroker:Superintending Structural
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 63 (1979).
96. Id.
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institutional reform cases, judges must abandon their adjudicative
role and become brokers among several diverse groups. Strategically, this alternative approach is predicated on a belief that the
reform process is a series of continuing bargaining games. 97 These
bargaining games afford the judge a broad range of choices in defining a proper judicial role, but the judge's capacity to manipulate
the political impact exceeds all other actors in the game, and he is
in a position to mold the political context of the case before him. 98
This "political bargaining model" of litigation implies a redefinition
of the appropriate standard of efficacy of the litigation process with
the underlying objective essentially becoming a political goal. 99
To accomplish this goal, a number of capacity issues must be
considered. Does the judge have sufficient information? Judges
need access, not only to social facts, but also to political factsinformation about the principal players and their agendas, power,
and bargaining skills.' 0 Many important political actors may be
beyond the reach of the court's formal powers. 101 Courts also often
lack resources for marshaling political and public support for their
decrees, without which their efforts will likely fail. 0 2
Does the judge have sufficient time to continuously administer
the decree? A judge can, to a limited extent, delegate.0 3 But, the
judge must maintain a fairly intensive, continuing, and personal involvement in the case. 104 Can the judge effectively communicate
the substance and intent of the remedial orders to ensure effective
action by others? Courts possess imperfect tools for communicating their decrees.01 5 Often, they must rely upon the institutional
defendant to disseminate and implement their orders. 06 Does the
judge have enough power to change behavior? Given that institutional reform requires cooperation among many actors, a successful reform must be flexible, targeted, and potent enough to
influence a wide range of behavior. 07 Most of the direct inducements a judge has are negative: citing someone for contempt, c10s97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 77-79.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
See Yoo, supra note 92, at 1138. See also Schuck, supra note 93, at 167.
Diver, supra note 95, at 97.
Id.
Yoo, supra note 92, at 1138.
Id.; see also Schuck, supra note 92, at 162.
Diver, supra note 95, at 99.
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ing an institution, or transferring authority to another official.' 0 8
These inducements are often not feasible in politicized litigation,
because their use can actually retard implementation. °9 Courts
have fewer direct resources than bureaucracies and legislatures for
guaranteeing compliance or creating positive incentives to encourage adherence to their orders.1 0 Judges must rely heavily on
the moral persuasiveness of their judgments to acquire legitimacy."' Further, the exercise of the political role runs the risk of
undermining the court's legitimacy and its effectiveness in reforming the institution. The adoption of a political perspective can
blur the distinction between right and remedy on which adjudicative legitimacy rests."2 As time goes on, the judge can draw "less
and less on the reserve of authority that the revered position of
neutral lawgiver confers."' 13
Those who argue against limiting judicial capacity point to steps
courts can take to overcome their limitations. For example, courts
can appoint a special master to assist the judge. 1 4 Such masters
can be chosen by the judge for their substantive expertise and
knowledge of the bureaucracy in question. The master, it is
claimed, can enter into negotiations with the parties and fulfill the
political role, while shielding the judge from direct involvement.
The problem with this argument is the lack of evidence linking the
use of masters to the effectiveness of institutional remedies. Indeed, the masters have seldom, if ever, been effective in finding
solutions that are both acceptable and constitutional.1 1 5 One study
of the use of masters in school desegregation cases found that masters were least suited to deal with institutions that needed the most

108. Id. at 99-102.
109. Id.
110. Yoo, supra note 92, at 1138.
111. Id.
112. Diver, supra note 95, at 104.
113. Id. at 106.
114. See Geoffrey F. Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases:
The Evolution of Roles in the Reformulation of Public Institutions Through Litigation,
7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739, 741 (1980); Ralph Cavanaugh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond A Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14
LAW AND Soc'y REV. 371, 407 (1980). See also Stephen L. Wasby, Arrogation of
Power or Accountability: 'Judicial Imperialism' Revisited, 65 JUDICATURE 209, 215
(1981).
115. See HOWARD KALODNER, LIMITS TO JUSTICE 9 (Howard Kalodner & James
Fishman eds., 1978).
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help and best able to work at a distance with institutions that
116
needed the least help.
Colin Diver cautions against having the master act as a political
broker to whom a judge can delegate his authority. 117 Authority
can be delegated only to a limited extent and a judge must still
1 18
maintain a fairly intensive personal involvement with the case.
An independent monitor such as a master becomes a new actor in
the equation whose position the judge must figure in the political
calculus. 1 9 "Because the monitor can disrupt operations or alienate potential allies, the court must exercise extreme caution in using this device to extend the reach of its physical capacity.' 120 In
other words, the crucial question of under which conditions special
21
masters will be effective has not been answered.'
Another mechanism purported to extend court capacity is the
retention of jurisdiction. In theory, if an institution experiences
difficulties, the parties can return to court if the decree requires
modification or is not being implemented. 122 Nonetheless, the
judge is not in any better position to sort through conflicting claims
or assess the technical, bureaucratic, and political facts on an ongoing basis than he or she was at designing the initial remedy. If anything, experience has shown that conflicts among multiple parties
23
become magnified as the implementation difficulties mount.
Further, actors that were not involved in the original litigation are
impacted during the course of reform and react.2 4 Significant social reform requires long-term planning and serious consideration
of costs. It is unclear how piecemeal decisions over implementation conflicts accomplishes the desired ends.
Attempts to effect fundamental social change through public institutions can also take years. Multiple implementation difficulties,
coupled with the often intractable nature of social, economic, and
political conditions, prolong this process. In 1994, federal judicial
116. David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court Appointed Masters, School Desegregation,and InstitutionalReform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313, 378 (1981).
117. Diver, supra note 95, at 97.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 99.
121. See ROSENBERG, supra note 76, at 30.
122. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1301 (1976); see also Wasby, supra note 114, at 215.
123. See Rosemary O'Leary & Charles R. Wise, Public Managers,Judges, and Legislators:Redefining the 'New Partnership'51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 316, 322-25 (1991).
124. Id.
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orders regulated 244 prisons in 34 different jurisdictions. 125 They
also set the level of inmate populations in 24 prisons. 126 A federal
court must also consider the termination point of judicial supervision. The Supreme Court has made it clear that federal court supervision of state and local institutions was intended to be
temporary. 127 This principle is in conflict with the fact that a district court will usually exercise jurisdiction over a case until the
constitutional violation has been cured.
"If the court defines its remedial goal in terms of reversing social trends and patterns, such as white flight, or in terms of compensating for irreversible losses, such as years spent in poor
termination
prison conditions, then there may be no foreseeable
''128
of the court's supervision of the state institution.
The Supreme Court's rule regarding the lower court's use of
their equitable powers to define the scope of a remedy provides
little guidance to district courts. Courts often, therefore, fall into
the trap of interminably pursuing a final remedy. The basic principle articulated by the Court is that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.' 1 29 The Court says this simply
means federal court decrees must directly address the constitutional violation itself.'30 Whether a remedy directly addresses a violation often rests in the eye of the beholder, and only in the rarest
of cases will an appellate court overturn a trial court's decree for
exceeding the scope of the violation. t 3 An expansive remedy designed to alter a fundamental social, institutional, economic, and
political landscape runs the risk of involving federal courts in the
perpetual supervision of state and local institutions. If that is the
only option, a federal court might well decide the wiser course of
action is to leave the supervision to a state court. State institutions
will likely confront a state judge more familiar with the substance
of what they do (in that state courts interact with them continuously over a wide range of matters). Additionally, state judges are
more conversant with the political facts that condition institutional
125. See THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, INC., THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 6
(1995), cited in Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration:Hearings on Prison Reform Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch); see also Yoo, supra note 92, at 1124.
126. Id.
127. See Board of Ed. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991).
128. See Yoo, supra note 92, at 1128.
129. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
130. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977).
131. Yoo, supra note 92, at 1132.
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response than federal judges. This solution also obviates important
federalism concerns, which will be elaborated upon later in the
article.
So far we have raised several questions federal courts could consider in assessing their capacity to provide a remedy for the sought
petition. First, can the court fulfill the informational requirements,
both technical and political, that would enable it to effect a successful remedy? Second, will the court have sufficient time to frame
and reformulate the remedy and conduct as it supervises the institutions involved? Third, are the communication tools available to
the court effective? Fourth, are the powers available to the court
sufficient to gain cooperation among the multiple actors? Fifth, is
there an identifiable goal for the remedy and a foreseeable end to
judicial supervision of the institution?
We already know federal courts consider such capacity questions
in their determination of abstention. For example, three homeless
women asked a federal district court to issue an injunction requiring the Commissioner of New York City's Human Resource Administration to provide lawful emergency housing to meet their
needs. 132 The court granted abstention declaring:
Allocation of resources for welfare programs is a task uniquely
within the sphere of local control. Placing that task under the
supervision of this court is a course fraught with dangers. This
court has no particular expertise in structuring welfare programs, or allocating scarce resources among competing needs.
Nor is it on familiar terms with the state and local political and
procedural apparatus which could come under its receivership
were it to proceed with deciding this case.133
This is an accurate assessment of the court's capacity in terms of
the issue and context of the service involved.
B. Federalism
During the 1990s, the Supreme Court extensively reinforced the
role of federalism in federal jurisprudence. 134 This reinforcement
has important implications for Burford abstention. 135 The Court
has stressed the fundamental importance of maintaining a balance
132. Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
133. Id. at 1470.
134. See generally Charles R. Wise, The Supreme Court's New ConstitutionalFederalism: Implicationsfor Public Administration, 61 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 343 (2001) (argu-

ing that decisions made by the Supreme Court since the early 1990's constitute a new
judicial federalism).
135. Id.
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of power between the federal government and the states. The
Court has also repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving the
notion of states as sovereign political communities (with governmental institutions responsive to its people). In Printz v. United
States, the Court stated, "The Constitution thus contemplates that a
State's government will represent and remain accountable to its
own citizens."' 3 6 In New York v. United States, the Court opined:
Where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished .... Where the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials canelectorate
not regulate in accordance with the views of the local
137
in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
In Alden v. Maine, the Court stated:
If the principle of representative government is to be preserved
to the States, the balance between competing interests must be
reached after deliberation by the political process established by
the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the
Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen ....
When the Federal Government asserts its authority over a
State's most fundamental political processes, it strikes at the
heart of the political accountability 1so
essential to our liberty
38
and republican form of government.
Federalism was also a primary concern of the majority in Burford.1 3 9 In affirming Burford abstention, the Supreme Court put
particular emphasis on the priority federalism concerns play in the
doctrine:
Equitable relief may be granted only when the District Court, in
its sound discretion exercised with the "scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of state governments which should at
all time actuate the federal courts" is convinced that the asserted
federal right cannot be preserved except by granting the "extraordinary relief of an injunction in the federal courts." Considering that "few public interests have higher claim upon the
discretion of a federal chancellor than avoidance of needless
136.
137.
138.
139.

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997).
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999).
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
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friction with state policies," the usual rule of comity must govern
the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court in this
case. Whatever rights appellee
may have are to be pursued
140
through the state courts.

Thus, the Supreme Court is clearly emphasizing that the basis for
abstention rests heavily on principles of federalism and that district
courts should assign a high priority to those principles in weighing
the case for abstention.
In NOPSI,1 41 the Supreme Court emphasized the broad interpretation of the state interest and the primacy it should receive in the
district court's assessment of the case for abstention:
Yet it is clear that the mere assertion of a substantial constitutional challenge to state action will not alone compel the exercise of federal jurisdiction. That is so because when we inquire
into the substantiality of the State's interest in its proceedings
we do not look narrowly to its interest in the outcome of the
particular case - which could arguably be offset by a substantial
federal interest in the opposite outcome. Rather, what we look
to is the importance of the generic proceedings to the State....
Because pre-emption-based challenges merit a similar focus, the
appropriate question here is not whether Louisiana has a substantial legitimate interest in reducing NOPSI's retail rate below
that necessary to recover its wholesale costs, but whether it has a
substantial, legitimate interest in regulating intrastate retail
rates. It clearly does. The regulation of utilities is one of the
most important functions
traditionally associated with the police
142
power of the States.
The Court's emphasis on the importance of generic proceedings
being mandated to the state clearly comports with the belief that
state courts constitute an independent system of adjudication with
sovereignty over matters of particular concern to them.1 43 It is also
consistent with the recognition that state courts are responsible for
upholding the Constitution and its guarantees. Thus, it is appropriate for state courts to adjudicate cases raising constitutional claims
when they have a strong interest in adjudicating a particular type of
dispute.' 4 4 This implies a reduction of the role of the federal trial
140. Ala. Pub. Service Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
141. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
142. Id. at 365 (citations omitted).
143. See Davies, supra note 13, at 24 (1986)
144. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-35 (1979). See also Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 460-63 (1974).
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courts as adjudicators of federal constitutional rights in certain
instances. 45
In Burford abstention, the federal claim is dismissed. This is distinct from Pullman abstention which calls for a postponement of
federal jurisdiction. Given that state courts are constitutionally obligated to protect federal constitutional rights, there is no apparent
need to retain federal trial jurisdiction. 146 Any errors in interpreting the U.S. Constitution may be corrected by certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.147 Yet, the emphasis on deference
to state courts is not unbounded. The Supreme Court has directed
district courts to assess several factors to ensure deference is warranted, as demonstrated in NOPSI:
Where timely and adequate state court review is available, a
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when
there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern., 148
The first requirement is that both timely and adequate state
court review is available to the plaintiff. The mere existence of an
administrative process or a potential conflict between a federal law
and a state regulation is not sufficient to warrant Burford abstention. 149 The discretion vested in state courts makes them working
partners in the development and administration of state regulatory
policy. State courts develop expertise and become competent partners of state agencies through the repeated exercise of their own
discretion. Federal courts do not have the opportunity to develop
such expertise and, thus, are not institutionally qualified for the
150
enterprise.
145. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 13, at 25. See also David Koury, Section 1983 and
Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 Loy. L. REV. 659, 660 n.100 (1979).
146. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the ConstitutionalLimits of the Judicial
Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 81 (1991).

147. Id.
148. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365
(1989) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
814 (1976)).
149. Id. at 362
150. Yelin, supra note 27, at 1882.
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The second requirement for federal court abstention is that the
federal suit must be limited to suits brought in equity. By confining
the use of the abstention doctrine to these cases, the court is able
to comply with statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts
and its ensuing obligation to hear such cases. Cases in equity require more discretionary judicial decision-making, so it is reasonable to emphasize federalism principles in the use of such discretion.
In addition, there must be difficult state law questions bearing on
public policy problems whose importance transcends the result of
the case at bar.1 51 In the absence of such questions, federalism
principles direct that because federal questions predominate, there
is little rationale to defer to state courts. Presumably, it is not
enough for the case to merely involve some difficult matter of state
law interpretation. More is required-the state law questions must
bear on policy problems of substantial public import, and the importance must extend beyond the result of the immediate case.
The potential for interference with a state regulatory scheme
would, under the principles of federalism, compel deference to
state courts. The absence of a significant impact on a state regulatory scheme removes the critical state interest and, it follows, leads
to retention of federal jurisdiction.
The issue of whether federal review would disrupt state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern potentially comports with federalism principles.
What would happen to the state regulatory scheme as a result of
federal judicial intervention? Since federal courts lack intimate
knowledge of state regulatory schemes and controlling state law, it
can be problematic for them to make such projections. As a result
of such unfamiliarity, federal judges may not foresee the impact on
the state scheme of regulation.
Taken as a whole, however, these factors are a useful starting
point for federal courts. In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court specified federal courts should conduct balancing tests based on a careful consideration of the federal interests in retaining jurisdiction
and the competing concern for the importance of state's interest
and the appropriateness of a state forum as the place to adjudicate
the issue. 52 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court also introduced a
measure of ambiguity in how federal courts are to strike a balance,
151. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colo. Riv., 424 U.S. at 814).
See also Yelin, supra note 27, at 1892.
152. Quackenbush Ins. Comm'r v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996) (citations omitted).
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when it stated, "This balance only rarely favors abstention, and the
power to dismiss recognized in Burford represents an 'extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."1 53 The purpose of this
observation is hard to discern. It makes little sense to set out specific factors to be used by federal courts in striking a balance, only
to issue a vague projection that concludes that the balance only
rarely favors abstention. Such a generalized admonition is at odds
with the more specific federalism principles offered by the Court,
in addition to the specific factors that were derived from those
principles. The most reasonable course of action for federal district
courts is to focus on the specific factors, weigh them, and then use
discretion. If the factors clearly weigh in favor of abstention, the
court can assume the balance favors abstention.
C. Administrative Responsibility
In scrutinizing a state regulatory scheme, federal courts have
tended to appraise state administrative agencies and state courts
together. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has only explicitly identified the availability of timely and adequate state court review as a
criteria for Burford abstention. 154 One remaining issue is whether
the use of Burford abstention would be aided if federal courts specified criteria for assessing agency action.
In Burford, the Supreme Court was asked to set a requirement
that federal courts review an administrative agency's order not for
its constitutionality, but for compliance with a standard of reasonableness under the state statute (which was said to differ from the
constitutional standard of due process).' 5 5 The Court refused, declaring that "the whole cycle of federal-state conflict cannot be permitted to begin again by acceptance of this view. Insofar as we
have discretion to do so, we should leave these problems of Texas
law to the state court where each may be handled as 'one more
item in a continuous series of adjustments."" 56 Other than that,
the Supreme Court has not had occasion to specify principles in the
doctrine that focus exclusively on the actions of the administrative
actor.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S 315, 332 (citing Railroad Comm.'n of Tex. v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584 (1940)).
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Anthony Bertelli and Lawrence Lynn propose that a primary criterion for Burford abstention should focus on the actions of the
administrative actor alone. 157 They argue, in essence, that a federal
district court should abstain from adjudicating constitutional claims
raised by plaintiffs seeking structural remedies where the management is not the proximate cause of the infringement of the right,
and the management is responsible. 158 The proximate cause criterion is directed at cases where the management has not been given
the opportunity to put into effect a plan or where there is simply no
proof that challenged managerial decisions in a given agency are
producing rights violations. 159 The administrative responsibility
criterion is met when the managerial decisions comport with a
"precept of managerial responsibility."' 60 This precept is composed of four distinct, demonstrable qualities: (1) accountability,
(2) judgment, (3) balance, and (4) rationality.16 1 In determining
whether the administrative actor had demonstrated administrative
responsibility sufficient to justify abstention, courts would weigh
each quality.
Bertelli and Lynn ground the precept of managerial responsibility in an extensive review of the American administrative experience. They argue that a federal court can ascertain the central
tendency of an agency as it pertains to administrative responsibility.' 62 If a federal court determines the central tendency of administrative responsibility is sufficient, then it would grant Burford
abstention. Bertelli and Lynn claim this test permits administrative
163
discretion in agency management that is responsibly exercised.
There are three advantages to this approach. First, it provides latitude for public managers to frame actions in a manner that deserves the approbation of the courts. 6 4 Second, the precept of
managerial responsibility would allow courts to encourage innovative solutions to policy problems by state and local governments,
reinforcing an important function of modern federalism. 65 Finally,
157. Anthony M. Bertelli & Lawrence E. Lynn. Jr., A Precept of Managerial Responsibility: Securing Collective Justice in Institutional Reform Litigation, 29 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 332 (2001).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 334, 347, 375-81.
162. Specifically, they state that "[rlesponsible public administration must incorporate such a precept at every level of managerial responsibilities." Id. at __
163. See id. at 332.
164. See id. at 384-85.
165. See id. at 334.
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it would improve democratic governance and further notions of
collective justice.166
In this regime, judicial review would take place in state courts
where the development of state administrative law would provide a
check against the misuse of power by public managers in state and
municipal agencies. State administrative law, more attuned to the
operational realities of a particular service, would encompass the
concerns of state legislatures and state courts- vindicating the interests of the public. This, in turn, would foster the development of
a common law rooted in the precept of managerial responsibility,
which would improve the check on administrative discretion. A
common law would allow for questions of responsibility to be adjudicated over time, rather than the ex ante structure that is imposed
when a federal7 court accepts a plaintiff's formulation of a public
16
agency's ills.
Can this precept of managerial responsibility be fitted into the
doctrine of Burford abstention? If so, what advantages and risks
might be encountered?
If achieved, the objective of providing latitude for public managers and encouraging discretion would be a valuable goal. Nonetheless, too much institutional reform litigation, while intended to
enable professional managers to bring about sought reforms, has
handcuffed them. 168 Managers are, thus, prevented from operating
the agency effectively and providing the necessary direction to ensure productive institutional reform. 16 9 While the intent of the
managerial responsibility precept is to provide increased latitude
for managers and promote discretion, there is a risk that if it is not
defined and implemented judiciously by the federal courts, it could
reduce managerial discretion even further. The reasons for this
166. See id. at 339-40; see also 342-47 (discussing the shortcomings of judicial review
and the effect it has on notions of collective justice).
167. See id. at 335.
168. See Jenkins v. Sch. Dist., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (terminating
federal court supervision of the Kansas City Metropolitan School District, rev'd en
banc, 213 F. 3d 720 (8th Cir. 2000). The district court cited to a long list of dislocations that the litigation and judicial supervision had caused and concluded that
"[t]hese byproducts of court oversight suggest that retention of judicial control may
be more disruptive than beneficial to the KCMSD. The court is drawn even closer to
this conclusion by the fact that the KCMSD and the Kansas City community have
repeatedly used the court's presence as a shield from responsibility." Id. at 1079.
169. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 748 (1992); Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural
Injunction, 7 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 395, 406 (1984); O'Leary, supra note 123, at
324.

416

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX

will be discussed below in conjunction with the analysis of the qualities of managerial responsibility.
The goal of respecting and preserving managerial discretion
should be taken seriously by the courts. In Marbury v. Madison,
Chief Justice Marshall pointed out the limited nature of judicial
review of administrative discretion: "The province of the courts is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the
executive, or executive officers, perform duties, in which they have
of discretion. ' 17° Federal courts have moved away from Marshall's
view of judicial review and replaced it with a judicial scrutiny that
has displaced agency expertise and political bargaining, which is
central to regulatory politics. 17 1 O'Brien observes that the "new
era" in administrative law presumes that agencies cannot be politically accountable for carrying out their delegated responsibilities
and that judicial judgment and competence are superior to that of
administrative agencies. 72 He concludes both these assumptions,
as Marbury recognized, are antithetical to the principle of separation of powers and the role of the judiciary in a constitutional system of free government.173 Of course, the task of "deciding on
rights" inevitably impinges on how executive officers perform their
duties. There is no easily drawn line. Nonetheless, as Shapiro
points out, "Many judicial decisions holding that an administrative
act fails for 'clear error of law' really arise in situations where a
statute allows a discretionary choice of interpretations and a court
'
believes that an agency has made a poor choice. "174
The ability of executive agencies to fulfill their mandate to implement programs necessitates the centrality of political control so
that the discretion used by administrators can be monitored:
Too often the search for legal control of discretion becomes
frantic and counterproductive because it conceives itself as either the only or the necessarily best mode of controlling discretion. The result may be an unrelenting pressure to introduce
formalized, courtlike proceedings and courts themselves into
more and more phases of government decision-making. There
are frequent complaints today that a climate of "adversary legal170. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
171. David O'Brien, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and Regulatory
Politics, in ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND PUBLIC POLICY 29, 47 (Douglas H.
Shumavon et al. eds., 1986).
172. Id.

173. Id.
174. Martin Shapiro, Discretion, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION
TRATIVE LAW 501-517, 511 (David H. Rosenbloom et al. eds., 1994).
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ism" is strangling the regulatory sphere of American governboth to
ment, creating inflexibility and inertia at huge costs
1 75
economic development and protection of the public.

Consideration needs to be given to the requirements of administrative responsibility and the contribution of public administrators
to serve the public effectively. Numerous public administration
scholars have found that administrators primarily try to limit their
responsibility and risk in discretionary situations. 176 This behavior
not only reduces the quality of government outputs for citizens, but
also undermines an organization's ability to achieve its primary
mission. Incentives are required to increase the engagement of
such public servants in order to secure greater personal involvement for their work and its consequences.177 What is not needed
are systems and doctrines that provide additional disincentives for
engagement. Engagement by public administrators requires
"thinking administration. 1 78 Public servants need to "think of
what ought to be done instead of merely doing that which must be
done.",'

79

Effective democratic administration requires more than adhering strictly to narrow legal prescriptions.18 0 To serve the goals of
democratic administration, administrative responsibility must extend beyond proving that administrators have avoided legal
prohibitions. Administrators must foster thinking about, and com175. Id. at 510.
176. Lois Recascino Wise, Public Personnel Motivation: The Public Service Culture,

in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CONCEPTS AND CASES 342 (Richard J. Stillman 1I ed.,
7th ed. 2000); see also Michael Lipsky, Toward a Theory of Street Level Bureaucracy,
in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN POLITICS, 186-212 (Willis D. Hawley et al.
eds., 1976); PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY 50 (1955); Bryan D.
Jones, DistributionalConsiderations in Models of Government Services Provision, 12
URB. AFF.

Q. 291, 301 (1977).

177. See Louis C. Gawthrop, 1998 John Gaus Lecture: The Human Side of Public
Administration, 31 PS: POL. SCIENCE & POL. 763-769 (1998), available at http://

www.apsanet.org.
178. Id. at 767.

179. Id. at 764-65 (citation omitted).
180. As Lois Wise observes:

In this sense, the demand for engagement challenges the morality of rulefollowing behavior. A religious leader may perform the forms and rituals of
the sacrament without engaging an internal spiritual emotion that creates an
affective bond with the congregation. Similarly, a bureaucrat may go
through the routines and motions of a job following the forms and rules
prescribed but never engaging an affective emotion for the citizen clients he
or she is positioned to serve, or in turn, feeling any concern for the outcome
of their interaction.
Wise, supra note 176, at 349.
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mitment to, the larger purposes of the programs being administered, spur innovative action to implement programs to achieve
positive outcomes for the intended beneficiaries. 8 ' Focusing only
on adhering to correct procedure undermines the very purpose of
administrative responsibility and ultimately the legitimacy of the
rule of law.' 82 To be effective, implementation of public programs
must be guided by an overall vision that cannot be realized by havfollow statutes and react to the political forces
ing public managers
183
of the moment.
While deriving purposes will be informed by statutory interpretation and political direction from elected officials, accomplishment of such a task inevitably requires the best judgment of the
public administrator. Even an unlimited amount of judicial supervision and guidance will not substitute for such judgment. Inevitably, some judgments will prove to be wrong. But, if the reaction to
wrong judgments is to attempt to legislate away all future errors,
the objective of administrative responsibility will be defeated. As
181. As applied to public management, the notion of professional responsibility is usually defined in terms of procedural obligations-for example, the
obligation to adhere faithfully to legislative intent and the details of due process, the obligation to obey the law, and the obligation to recognize and
respect the inviolability of organizational superior-subordinate relationships.
If democracy, however, is viewed as a parabolic way of thinking about life in
a community rather than as an institutional contrivance, the notion of professional responsibility assumes a role of major proportions in our democratic equation.
Louis C. GAWTHROP, PUBLIC SERVICE AND DEMOCRACY: ETHICAL IMPERATIVES
FOR THE

2

1ST CENTURY

142 (1998) (footnote omitted).

182. Public managers must recover the truly authentic and creative freedom to
decide what they should do ethically in resolving the daily conflicts and challenges that confront them. Until they are capable of freeing themselves
from the bondage of habit, any attempt to define professional behavior as
truly ethical is an exercise in futility that can only result in pathetic selfdeception. The habits of the self-serving good allow public servants to pursue procedural, quasi-ethical life. The net result, to paraphrase H. Richard
Niebuhr, is a government of persons without fault, operating in a society
without judgment, through the ministrations of a Constitution without a
purpose.
Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
183. The implementation of public policy-like the rule of law, or the administration of justice, or the recognition of any of the inalienable rights we revere-involves much more than the mechanistic application of statutory and
programmatic directives that can be shaped solely on the basis of immediate
benefit or pragmatic expediency. The administrative implementation of policy must incorporate a teleological sense of purpose that clearly transcends
the exigencies of the present.
Id. at 34.
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former Supreme Court Justice Jerome
Frank observed, it will not
184
eliminate the effect of human error.

In addition, the attempt to eliminate error by making every injury a constitutional issue will not eliminate error from the administration of programs. The Supreme Court recognized as much in
DeShaney v. Winnebago City Department of Social Services, where
a small boy was severely beaten by his father and suffered permanent damage.185 The county department of social services had not
placed the child into protective custody after investigating the situation.186 The Court refused to find the department or its employees liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and observed that the plaintiff
could find relief under state tort law. But the Court went on to
declare that "the claim here is based on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which, as we have said many times,
does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a
constitutional violation."1"7 The Court recognized that state employees may have made an error in not acting, but also faced the
risk of error by acting prematurely. 188
If public administrators are empowered to make judgments that
sometimes may be in error, what legitimates their right to do so,
and what are the implications for the assessment of administrative
responsibility? The legitimacy of public administrators to make
judgments in pursuit of public purposes is grounded in our constitutional traditions. In particular, the legitimacy is found in the executive power provided in the Constitution. As Hamilton
explained, "energy in the executive" is essential to good govern184. It is imperative that in a democracy it should never be forgotten that pub-

lic
office is, of necessity, held by mere men with human frailties ....
To pretend, then that government, in any of its phases, is a machine; that it is not a
human affair; that the language of statutes- if only they were adequately
worded- plus appeals to the upper courts, will, alone, do away with the effect of human weakness in government officials is to worship illusion. And it
is a dangerous illusion.
JEROME FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: SOME ASPEcTs OF DEMOCRACY 3-7 (1942).
185. DeShaney v. Winnebago County. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191
(1989).
186. Id. at 192.
187. Id. at 202.
188. The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they
stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more
active role for them. In defense of them it must also be said that had they
moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would
likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parentchild relationship, charges based on the same Due Process Clause that forms
the basis for the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection.
Id. at 203.
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ment. 8 9 Further, the legitimacy of public administration within
our constitutional scheme is also derived from its role in the three
branches of government-it is the provider of the public health,
safety, and welfare. The constitutional system embraces public administration within its political design, 19 which makes public administration fully engaged in the development of public policy and
in the acts of governing.
The Constitution may not have made public administrators equal
players with the three branches of government, but it did so in an
operational sense in that public administrators are asked to govern. 191 This, in itself, confers a measure of constitutional legitimacy
to public administrators. A number of institutions and practices
within the American governmental system are not explicitly referred to in the Constitution, including, perhaps most notably, the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review, and the power of congressional committees. Although not express in the Constitution,
these practices and groups are regarded as constitutional and legitimate. The constitutional legitimacy of public administration was
manifest in the early understandings and practices of Congress, and
has been reinforced and supplemented by the decisions of later
Congresses. 92 This, of course, does not exempt public administration from ensuring the rights of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution. There is no a prioriprinciple, however, that places public
administration on a more unfavorable footing vis-A-vis
the other
93
institutions of government.
If public administrators enjoy the constitutional legitimacy to
make judgments in pursuit of public purposes, there are important
implications for the judicial approach to assessing administrative
responsibility. The threshold presumption cannot be a presump189. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks: it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws;
to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction,
and of anarchy.
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).
190. See Jeremy Rabkin, BureaucraticIdealism and Executive Power: A Perspective

on the Federalist's View of Public Administration in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 187-205, 196-97 (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987).

AND

191. See Charles Wise, Public Administration is Constitutional and Legitimate, 53
257, 257-61 (1993).

PUB. ADMIN. REV.

192. See JAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 127 (1978).
193. See Wise, supra note 191, at 260.
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tion of administrative irresponsibility which the administrative actor has the burden to rebut. That is, courts should not place the
burden on administrators to prove that they are not guilty of administrative irresponsibility. Rather, the presumption of the court
should be one of administrative responsibility.
Bertelli and Lynn's proposal for a precept of managerial responsibility embraces this idea. Whether "it works" will depend on how
it is treated and developed by federal and state courts. Bertelli and
Lynn advocate that federal courts should defer to the states when
the institutional defendant is governed by a precept of managerial
responsibility. In addition, they suggest a common law process in
which the courts will flesh out the contours of the four qualities
that constitute their precept of managerial responsibility: judgment, accountability, balance, and rationality. 94
Two potential risks arise in their precept of administrative response. These must be avoided if the projected benefits for managerial discretion are to be attained. First, there is potential for
duplication and conflict between federal and state courts in assessing the administrative responsibility of state administrative actors.
Second, courts may become overly intrusive in defining the qualities that constitute administrative responsibility.
With regard to the potential duplication of effort, there is little in
the precept that establishes the division of labor between federal
and state courts. If a federal court conducts an assessment of the
four qualities in order to determine whether it should grant Burford abstention, and, after abstention is granted, the state court
subsequently conducts its own assessment of the four qualities, it is
difficult to see how the state actor is going to gain more latitude.
The four qualities could cause the federal court to inquire more
deeply into agency decisions and operations in the context of the
abstention decision than otherwise would be the case in preliminary matters. But, there is potential for two sets of common law
associated with the four qualities to be developed (one federal and
one state). If that is realized, the criteria for Burford abstention
would become more muddled.
A division of responsibility between the federal and state courts
needs to be established in order to coordinate their assessment
roles. We recommend that instead of federal courts taking a "hard
look" at the administrative responsibility of state actors, that they
adopt a softer posture. This is analogous to what the Supreme
194. See Bertelli & Lynn, supra note 157, at 336.
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Court specified in Burford for determining whether adequate and
timely state judicial review of the regulatory action was available
where there are difficult questions of state law bearing on important public policies.' 95 In this instance, the federal court would
look to see whether the state courts have developed a body of common law for assessing administrative responsibility. Or, in the case
of relatively new agencies, if the regulatory scheme established by
the state provides state court assessment of administrative responsibility. If a federal court finds that the requisite structure is in
place, and the agency's action can be assessed in terms of administrative responsibility within that structure, then abstention would
be granted. 196 The advantage of this approach is that it will obviate
the need for federal courts to make subjective determinations of
what constitutes administrative responsibility. Instead, the federal
court will simply inquire whether the state is vigorously pursuing a
course of fleshing out the principles of administrative responsibility, and whether it is resolving disputes in accordance with those
principles. Another advantage is that the predictability, or foreseeability, which is desirable in the resolution of disputes, will be preserved.' 97 States actively pursuing a course of elaborating
principles of administrative responsibility can offer their citizens a
forum that will predictably warrant abstention from the federal
courts on issues of administrative responsibility.
Some may be concerned that deference to state courts will deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to vindicate their claims in federal court. However, the Supreme Court has held that in
procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a
constitutionally protected interest is not necessarily unconstitutional.1 98 But, "What is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such
an interest without due process of law."' 99 What is significant constitutionally is that the claim or right be adjudicated and the admin195. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989).
196. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984). The scheme would operate in a similar fashion to the two-step test in Chevron
where the reviewing court asks: (1) whether Congress has spoken to the precise issue,
and if not, (2) whether the agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
197. See ALFRED C. AMAN & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 311-12
(1993).
198. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 642-43 (1999) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
199. Id.
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istrative responsibility of the state actor be assessed-not that the
original trial take place in a federal forum.
Avoiding over-intrusiveness by the courts in the definition of administrative responsibility is yet another concern. Given that the
four qualities have not been the subject of previous adjudication, it
is possible for them to be interpreted in ways that either respect or
restrict discretion of administrative actors.
Martin Shapiro offers a telling review of judicial supervision of
rule-making in the federal government that provides a basis for
caution for judicial development of a common law for the assessment of rationality of administrative actions in the institutional reform context. 200 As Shapiro traces the development of the federal
judicial approach to rule-making, he demonstrates how courts
moved from a posture of deference, to one insisting on procedural
correctness, to one demanding substantive rationality, to one requiring synoptic rulemaking: a perfect rule-making process.20
What began as procedural review evolved into a review of the substance of rules and their rationality. Rationality, in turn, evolved
into synopticism. Shapiro went on to point out that synopticism is
about using the right process to arrive at the right decision-the
decision that chooses the correct policy to arrive at the true values
at the least cost. As such, it entirely merges the procedural and the
substantive in arriving at a "right" answer.20 2 Federal judges
adopted the following posture toward administrative actors: "If
you are claiming expert discretion, prove to us that your decision is
expert-that is the correct decision based on scientific knowledge. ' '2 3 That, of course, is an impossible directive given the
unknowns of scientific knowledge and uncertainties in human behavior. This policy forced agencies to "pretend" synopticism in
their presentations and supporting documentation. The results
were disastrous: the rule-making process slowed, decision-making
shifted from responsible administrators to gun-shy lawyers, and
documentation exploded.2 °4 Initially, this resulted in a major in205
crease in judicial discretion over administrative policymaking.
Over time, however, agencies learned how to present their deci200. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION 155-58 (1988).
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See id. at 119.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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sions as if they were synoptic decisions. 2°6 As a result, judges lost
the ability to penetrate the presentations and documentation and
began "to yield to the technocratic defense that they have forced
the agencies to create. ' 2 7 Thus, instead of the synoptic standard
for assessing the rationality of agency decisions, Shapiro argues
that a standard of prudence is more realistic.20 8 Prudence demands
"the grave effort of experienced persons to make their best guess
as to what course of future action ought to be pursued given our
our sense of what
past experience, our current condition, and
20 9
others will do in response to what we do."
The risk in assessing the rationale of administrative action in the
institutional reform context is that courts will drift toward a synoptic standard rather than a prudential one. Similarly, with the qualities of judgment, balance, and accountability,210 there will be the
opportunity for courts to substitute their subjective notions for
those of administrators and legislators. Bertelli and Lynn are correct in declaring that "there is no one right answer to the complex
questions of governance, and reasonable legislators, stakeholders,
and judges may well differ on the manager's exercise of responsibility."' 211 The question, going forward, is will the courts be able to
collectively develop a consistency of interpretation that provides
sufficient forseeability and predictability for public managers. "An
egregious, another
arguable gap in reasoning that one court finds
212
may find forgivable, if not defective at all."
Whether courts will adopt a precept of managerial responsibility
will depend, in part, on the circumspection of judges in assessing
the constituent qualities of administrative responsibility. If judges
continue to focus on the central tendency of the condition of administrative responsibility exhibited by a particular administrative
agency the risk of over- intrusiveness should be minimized. In addition, having oversight of administrative responsibility of state
agencies primarily assigned to state courts means that if overreaching occurs, it is more likely that the state legislatures will intervene
and take corrective action.
206. Id. at 154.
207. Id. at 155.
208. Id. at 142.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
211. See Bertelli & Lynn, supra note 157, at 384.
212. Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law
from Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of JudicialFederalismunder Burford v. Sun
Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 955 (1993).

2001]

ABSTENTION'S POTENTIAL ROLE

The challenge for federal courts will be to oversee administrative
agencies, but not to intervene too quickly and place agencies under
federal court supervision. In other words, federal courts need to
show deference when state agencies are confronting the same
problems that federal courts face and are deeply committed to conducting detailed oversight. Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio213 is
an example of this very approach. In Sierra Club, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction when it was alleged that the City's
use of the Edwards Aquifer was killing the fountain darter, an en214
dangered species, in violation of the Endangered Species Act.
The district court found that, because the state agency assigned to
a plan for
regulating the use of water had not had time to develop
215
merited.
not
was
abstention
aquifer,
the
managing
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court,
saying it was an abuse of discretion and that abstention was appropriate under Burford. The appellate court rejected the contention
that Burford abstention is applicable only where the state regulatory scheme is fully in place. 1 6 In fact, the court stressed the need
to allow the state agency to address problems in a comprehensive
way:
In one appeal our court recognized abstention concerns, and
particularly Burford abstention, as sometimes calling for federal
court abstention. The Edwards Aquifer contains a finite
amount of water, and as such, the need for uniform regulation is

paramount. The Supreme Court has recognized that such circumstances sometimes require the federal courts to abstain to
allow the state's comprehensive regulatory scheme to operate
without the risk of competing attempts between the regulator
and the federal courts to exercise control over the same
entity. 217
The Court of Appeals explicitly recognized a district court could
be tempted to substitute its judgment for that of the state administrative agency and cautioned against federal courts giving into such
temptation. 218 The court admonished the district court to avoid insisting the agency arrive at the same substantive decision that the
213. Sierra Club v. San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997).
214. Id. at 793.
215. Id. at 793-94.
216. Id. at 796.
217. Id. at 792 (citing Sierra Club v. Babbit, No. 94-50260, slip op. at 6 (5th Cir. Oct.
18, 1995)).
218. Id. at 795-96.
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district court would.2 1 9 If appellate courts proceed in the direction
of the Fifth Circuit, federal courts may be led to strike the appropriate balance between overseeing the administrative responsibility
of agencies and respecting the right of agencies to exercise discretion in furtherance of their legal objections.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the purposes of Burford abstention are to be met, it is imperative for the doctrine to be more fully developed. This task is not an
impossible one. The seeds of development can be found in Burford itself. Additional guidance can be found in the principles articulated by the Supreme Court and in the on-going learning that is
inevitable where effective public administration is already being realized. To be effective, federal courts need to focus on the specific
requirements for the doctrine and apply them with some specificity
and consistency.
As we have reviewed here, specific requirements involved in the
principles of capacity, federalism, and administrative responsibility
all play a role in arriving at a sensible division of labor between
federal and state courts. These principles also aid administrative
agencies in advancing needed institutional reform in state and local
agencies where rights violations are involved. No one principle
provides the touchstone for resolution of the deference dilemma.
However, used in combination with the right focus on the application to the specific state institutional context, the courts can potentially arrive at a more systematic and consistent treatment of
institutional reform.

219. The court's action indicates it is willing to abstain as long as the state
authority agrees with it. The purpose of Burford abstention is to discourage
federal court second-guessing of state regulatory matters. Burford abstention is particularly appropriate where "by proceeding the district court
would have risked reaching a different answer than the [state] institutions
with greater interest in and familiarity with such matters."
Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1993).

